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Abstract
In this essay we describe a platonic metaphysics where time is a fundamental
idea such that the passage of time is independent of observers and the laws of
physics. Furthermore, time serves to distinguish between a real and an abstract
universe, where a real universe is an appropriatelly ordered set of ideas in time, while
an abstract universe is such a set outside of time. We allow for non-computable
and non-mathematical ideas to be part of our model of the universe in order to
include intelligent observers. The part of the universe which can be described by
mathematics corresponds to a mathematical structure in Tegmark’s sense, while
the non-mathematical part can be described by a human language. We describe
the mind-brain connection in our framework, and show that it resolves the problem
of obtaining abstract knowledge in platonism. We briefly discuss how different
interpretations of Quantum Mechanics can be implemented in our framework and
point out some physics implications, most notably that the time travel would be
impossible.
1 Introduction
Plato’s idea that our ideas have existence independent of us and outside of space and time
has been developed into a philosophical system known as platonism, see [1]. Recently, the
platonic approach has been used by M. Tegmark to construct a theory of a mathemat-
ical universe [2], where it was postulated that our universe is the same as the ultimate
mathematical structure which describes it. Note that this is a reduced version of platon-
ism, since in Tegmark’s approach the world of ideas consists only of certain mathematical
structures. The main assumption of Tegmark is that everything that exists is reducible
to a finite mathematical structure, and furthermore, he restricts the world of ideas to
computable mathematical structures. Another salient feature of Tegmark’s approach is
that time is not a fundamental concept, but a phenomenon experienced by an observer.
These assumptions are acceptable if one believes that time is not fundamental and that
the human mind is computable. In this essay we are going to advocate a different platonic
metaphysics, namely the one where time is a fundamental concept. Furthermore, the time
will serve to distinguish between an abstract and a real universe. We will also allow for
non-computable and non-mathematical ideas to be part of a model of our universe. The
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computable part will be then described by the fundamental physical laws, i.e. by a
mathematical structure in Tegmark’s sense. The non-computable part will then require
another set of laws, so that psychology could not be derived from the Standard Model.
There are strong arguments that the human mind is not computable, based on Goedel’s
theorems in logic, see [3]. As far as time is concerned, the arguments which are usually
invoked against it are:
1. The mathematical structure of General Relativity (GR) is that of a 4-manifold with
a pseudo-Riemannian metric and considering a time-like coordinate as time does not
give a unique definition of time. Also there is no unique foliation of the spacetime
manifold into space-like hypersurfaces.
2. In quantum gravity, finding a time variable in general case is difficult [4].
Clearly these arguments are related to the problem of how to define time within GR or
within quantum gravity, but a lack of a good mathematical definition of time does not
imply that time is an illusion or an emergent property.
There are various indications that there is something fundamental concerning time.
If time were not a fundamental concept, then one would expect that the physical metrics
would have Euclidean signatures so that there would be no special time-like directions.
On the other hand, spacetime metrics with Minkowski signatures allow us to split the
spacetime into space and time3. In quantum gravity the split into space and time is
preserved at the topological level when the canonical quantization formalism is used.
The topology S × R with a preferred space-like foliation is also used in the discretized
path-integral approach of Dynamical Causal Triangulations where de Sitter metric can
be recovered in the semiclassical limit [5].
We will consider the clock time as a rate of passage of time. This rate will depend on
the clock trajectory, so that there will be no conflict with Special Theory of Relativity
(STR). However, the passage of time will be absolute, in the sense that it will be observer-
independent phenomenon. We will also consider the passage of time as a fundamental
concept, not reducible to other simpler concepts. We will implement this idea in a Platonic
metaphysics and we will postulate that our Universe is a more general structure then the
one used by Tegmark in order to allow for the ideas of time-like change and intelligence
to be irreducible.
2 The world of ideas
We will consider that everything that exists, be it a real object in spacetime or an abstract
idea, to be an idea. We will call the set of all ideas the World of Ideas (WI), and let us
divide WI into mathematical and non-mathematical ideas.
2.1 Mathematical ideas
The mathematical ideas can be characterized by using finite sets (i.e. finite sets of integers
or finite sets of symbols) and relations between them. This can be pictured as a collection
3This can be always done locally, while globally can be done for a large class of metrics, i.e. the
globally hyperbolic ones.
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of labeled graphs, and a mathematical idea or a mathematical structure (a collection of
mathematical ideas) would be a (finite) graph whose vertices carry finite ordered sequences
of integers. One can then introduce notions of equivalent graphs, subgraphs, reducible
graphs, irreducible graphs, symmetries, etc, see [2].
The set of finite graphs with finite-length labels corresponds to the mathematical
structures used by Tegmark. However, one can imagine more general structures, like
graphs with infinite-length labels or infinite graphs.
In the set of labeled graphs LG one can introduce relations, which means that we need
to extend LG to
RG = LG ∪ (LG)2 ∪ (LG)3 ∪ · · · ∪ (LG)n ∪ · · · .
Let us consider a subset O of RG, i.e. a set of ideas with relations. Again one can think
of these objects as labeled graphs, but now the vertices are elements of LG, i.e. the ideas.
Let us define a history H as a subset of O such that
H =
⋃
t∈I
St ,
where I ⊆ R and St ≺ St′ if t < t
′ and ≺ is a relation of order in O.
This definition is based on the model of a universe where the spacetime is a manifold
of topology S ×R, while the elementary particles are described by their world-lines, or
the world-tubes, in the case of String Theory. If we take I ⊆ Z, then we can consider
H as a generalization of the simplicial complex corresponding to the spacetime manifold
containing matter. The sets St can be considered as generalizations of the spatial sections
of S×R. The links (relations) between the elements of St will be called spatial relations,
while the links between the elements of St and St′ , where t 6= t
′, will be called temporal
relations.
2.2 Time
Let us introduce the idea of time-like change or passage of time T . We will assume that T
is a non-mathematical and an irreducible idea. A temporal universe U would be a (H, T )
pair, where the instant of now is moving along the levels St of H with t increasing. This is
based on our experience of time passage when observing a particle (or an object) changing
its position in space, or when observing an object changing its form. The identity of a
particle or an object will be determined by its temporal relations, i.e. by its world-line
or a world-tube. A simplified picture of a temporal universe would be a D-dimensional
manifold with a moving (D − 1)-dimensional submanifold.
This picture may seem to be at odds with Special Theory of Relativity (STR), but
there is no conflict, because the time in STR refers to clock readings, which are trajectory
dependent. The clock time can be viewed as a rate of passage of time, and that rate
depends on a clock trajectory and the laws of physics, while the passage of time is absolute,
in the sense that is independent from a clock trajectory and from the laws of physics.
Another analogy would be that a history H can be considered as a digital video
disc (DVD) and T as a DVD-player, so that a temporal universe U(H, T ) would be the
corresponding movie played on a screen. When comparing to Tegmark’s approach, one
can see that for him any history H with appropriate features would be a universe like
the one in which we live. For us a history H would be a timeless universe, and only the
composition U(H, T ) would be a universe like ours.
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2.3 The observers
When constructing a theory of everything, or more generally a metaphysics, one has to
define the intelligent beings or the observers. In Tegmark’s approach the observes are
part of the ultimate mathematical structure MS, which is the same as the history H .
Since we do not believe that a human mind can be completely described by mathematics,
we will assume that intelligence is a non-mathematical idea and therefore for a universe
with observers we will have that MS ⊂ H .
We can think of an observer as a bound state of elementary particles, which can be
pictured as a set of intricately braided trajectories, with a special structure, called brain.
The brain has capability of capturing and storing ideas, which can be mathematical and
non-mathematical. The mind at some instant of time will be the set of ideas stored in
the brain, or more generally it can be considered as a temporal sequence of sets of ideas
with corresponding relations stored in our brain. The ideas stored in our brain can be of
two types: the ideas which are records of our interactions with the environment and the
ideas which are not this, i.e. the abstract ideas.
A simplified picture of an observer would be a single world-line with a finite set of
hooks attached to it. The hooks would represent brain at distinct moments of time. The
ideas in observer’s brain could be then pictured as colored graphs attached to the hooks.
The number of ideas on a hook is increasing with time4, corresponding to our increasing
memory and knowledge. Preserving the identity of an observer requires that
I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ In ,
where Ik is the set of ideas in his brain at time instant tk and n is his lifespan.
The process of forming a theory for a certain set of phenomena can be then explained
in the following way. An observer will have the record of his interactions with the en-
vironment related to these phenomena, i.e. the results of experiments. Let us denote
this set of ideas at the moment t1 as R1 . At the moment t2 he will have in his brain a
mathematical structure M2 = M which will be related to R2 = R1, i.e. which is explain-
ing the experimental results. The new experimental results R3 at the moment t3 will be
then correlated with the structure M3 = M so that at the moment t4 he will either have
M4 = M , if the new results can be explained by M , or M4 = M
′, if the new results can
be explained by another mathematical structure M ′, and so on.
Since we do not believe in reductionism, then there will be phenomena where the ob-
server cannot use only a mathematical structure as his theory. Such a theory will be then
described in terms of a human language (this is situation in biology, psychology, social
sciences and philosophy). A human language looks like a mathematical structure (finite
list of symbols with finite length words and sentences) but the meaning or truthfulness
of words and sentences, when they do not refer to a mathematical structure, is not es-
tablished by relating them to a finite fixed set of axioms. The meaning is established by
relating them to the world around us (which is reflected in our minds).
4At short time scales the number of ideas in a brain could decrease due to memory loss, but this
number increases or stays constant over the longer periods.
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2.4 Our universe
The following simplified description of our universe can be now given. We can imagine our
universe as the simplicial complex corresponding to a spacetime manifold of dimension
D, such that the vertices contain labeled graphs, i.e. ideas. There will be a preferred
foliation of the complex into subcomplexes of dimension D − 1, and the instant of now
will run through these subcomplexes. We will take t ≥ 0, corresponding to a universe
with a beginning. At early times the vertices will contain only the n-tuples of numbers,
corresponding to the fundamental constituents of space and matter. At some later time the
hooks (brains) will appear and the vertices will also contain graphs (ideas) corresponding
to minds of intelligent beings.
The edges of the spacetime simplicial complex would correspond to the temporal
and the spatial relations of the history H of our universe5. The physical part of the
universe will be given by the skeleton of H , MS(H), which is the largest subgraph of H
given by a mathematical structure. However, the observers will contain non-mathematical
ideas beside the mathematical ones, and this by definition can not be a part of some
mathematical structure.
A useful analogy would be that of a decorated tree, where the tree is a mathematical
structure, while the decorations are the minds of intelligent beings. The decorations are
not the part of the tree mathematical structure. This decorated tree would represent a
timeless history of a universe with observers, and in order to turn it into a living universe,
we need to “switch on” the time, i.e. to compose it with the idea of passage of time T . A
temporal universe would be then analogous to a burning decorated tree, where the flames
would form a transversal surface and move from the bottom to the top of the tree. The
burned part of the tree would be the past, the burning part would be the present and the
future would be the part above the flames.
The universe we have described so far is essentially a classical one, but our approach is
sufficiently general so that a quantum universe can be accommodated. How to implement
this will depend on the interpretational scheme of Quantum Mechanics (QM) one believes
in. However, all interpretations share a common feature: one needs multiple universes in
order to accommodate the probabilistic nature of QM, as well as the existence of states
which are linear combinations of two or more classically different states.
For example, the Many Worlds interpretation, for a review and references see [6], will
require history branchings, i.e. for t ≥ t0 the sets St in H will be disjoint unions of sets
S
(k)
t such that there are no relations among them, except for the relation corresponding to
the wavefunction which is a linear combination of the corresponding states. The histories
Hk will correspond to parallel universes, and in each of them an observable Ω will have a
value ωk.
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, see [7], appears to be a single universe interpre-
tation, since each particle follows a single trajectory, and all particles are guided by the
wavefunction. However, the initial condition on the wavefunction requires an ensemble of
the universes with different initial conditions. The question then arises about the status
of other histories, i.e. are they also realized in time or are they timeless? The first option
would lead to a Many Worlds interpretation without branching, while the second option
would mean that a single temporal history is chosen randomly, or picked by some other
5For a realistic H the corresponding graph will be more complicated than the one-complex of a D-
dimensional manifold.
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criterion, like the maximum of the initial probability distribution6.
3 Conclusions
We have presented a Platonic metaphysics where time plays the essential role: it serves
to distinguish between real and abstract universes. This role of time together with our
proposed mind-brain connection resolves the epistemological problem in platonism [1].
Namely, if the abstract ideas are outside of spacetime, then how can we do mathematics?
According to our approach, the answer is that our mind, which is a temporal sequence of
ideas contained in our brain, will contain the copies of these abstract ideas.
An important consequence of the assumption that passage of time is a non-mathematical
idea, is that mind is not a mathematical structure. This is because we can imagine pro-
cesses in time, so that the idea of passage of time is contained in our mind. Hence our
mind is not a mathematical structure. This then implies that a mind can not be simulated
on a computer.
Note that our approach represents a generalization of von Neumann’s idea to formulate
QM as a theory of evolving objective universe interacting with human consciousness,
see [9]. In theories with global time, the conflict with relativity can be avoided if one
postulates that the label t is not the same as a clock reading and that a clock reading
depends on the clock trajectory. On the other hand, it is clear that t is related to the age
of the universe. Since t always increases, then the time travel will be impossible within
our framework.
From the platonic perspective, existence of multiple universes is natural, since all
possible universes exist as objects in the World of Ideas. Furthermore, by assuming that
the passage of time is a fundamental and a non-emergent concept, one can divide all
possible universes into the temporal ones and the timeless ones. The temporal universes
can be then considered as real, i.e. like the universe we live in, while the timeless universes
can be considered as abstract.
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